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Abstract  
 
Eutrophication from nitrogen and phosphorus has damaged the Baltic Sea, leaving large sea 
bottom areas without biological life, thus changing the marine ecosystem, and triggering the 
growth of toxic algae. Despite efforts to curb this pollution, the sea remains eutrophic. We 
argue that eutrophication management is subject to both uncertainty and irreversibility, and 
hence could explain why impacted countries may not be willing to enforce load reduction 
targets. This thesis focuses on the time lag of benefits following nitrogen abatement. The 
time taken for concentration levels to decrease after abatement is uncertain, leading to 
uncertain benefits. Using the quasi option value model, we calculate the value of learning 
this information, and thus find that removing this uncertainty is worth over 8.6 billion EUR, 
to all bordering countries. This could be of significant importance for actors rationally 
waiting for more information, before implementing expensive and irreversible policy.  
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1. Introduction  
The Baltic Sea is surrounded by nine littoral countries, all of which benefit from its 
amenities and ecosystem services. However, these services are at risk due to an excessive 
pollution of nitrogen and phosphorus. The over enrichment of these nutrients are referred 
to as eutrophication. This has caused severe environmental concerns; decreased water 
transparency, growth of toxic algae, which when decays cause a depletion of oxygen levels, 
altering the marine ecosystems. An example being diminishing fish and seal stock. Human 
activities have affected the natural processes of the sea, and are considered to be one of the 
main causes of this over enrichment (Smith et al 1999). The use of phosphorus detergents 
and chemical fertilisers for example, have greatly increased the amount of nitrates and 
phosphates that are washed into lakes and ponds.  
 
The Baltic Sea is one of the largest brackish water basins in the world. It can be 
separated into seven main basins as shown in Figure 1 (Bothnian Bay, Bothnian Sea, Baltic 
Proper, Gulf of Finland, Gulf of Riga, Danish Straits, and Kattegat). These basins differ 
considerably in their characteristics, including ice cover, temperature, and water residence 
time. The sub-basins differ not only in size, volume, and depth, but also in the salinity of the 
water, which is crucial for animal and plant life (HELCOM 2009). The large catchment area 
combined with associated human activities, and a small body of water, with limited 
exchange with the Skagerrak and the North Sea, makes the Baltic Sea vulnerable to nutrient 
enrichment and eutrophication (HELCOM 2009). The first signs of eutrophication emerged in 
the mid 1950’s (Andersen et al 2015). 
 
Eutrophication is a significant issue for the littoral countries, and has resulted in 
mounting pressure on their respective governments, to act and enforce policies to reduce 
this pollution. The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) was set up in 1974 (the contracting 
parties are Denmark, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, 
Russia and Sweden) with the aim of protecting the marine environment of the Baltic Sea, 
from all sources of pollution through intergovernmental cooperation. Original efforts aimed 
at cutting emission (nitrogen and phosphorus) to the sea by 50%, set in the late 1980’s were 
never met. In 2007 the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP) readdressed previous targets, and 
outlined new country wise nutrient input reduction targets. These reductions are based on 
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the current input and previous reduction efforts (Tynkkynen et al 2014). However, the sea 
still remains eutrophic.  
 
In this thesis we argue that countries may be reluctant to commit to load reduction 
targets, due to the associated uncertainties and irreversibilties of eutrophication 
management. Firstly, it is unclear what the expected costs and benefits from abatement 
policies are. The impacted countries may therefore be unwilling to invest in nutrient 
reduction strategies, if deemed to be unprofitable in the long run. Although a large body of 
literature has attempted to clarify costs and benefits (Turner et al 1999, Gren et al 1997a, 
Gren et al 1997b, Gren et al 2008a), these values are often derived using numerous 
assumptions, and so needs to be taken with caution. Secondly, the different characteristics 
of the of the Baltic Sea basins, means cost effective reductions can vary between basins 
(Gren 2008b). Thus leading to further uncertainty on the actual reductions that should be 
employed. Another uncertainty relates to the nutrient limiting growth in a particular basin. 
Although both nitrogen and phosphorus cause eutrophication, some basins are nitrogen 
limited, and hence algae production is only affected by changes in nitrogen concentrations, 
not phosphorus (see e.g Conley et al 2002, Wasmund and Uhlig 2003, Tamminen and 
Andersen 2007). These are just some of the uncertainties that face decision makers when 
selecting appropriate policies. Environmental decisions are often regarded as irreversible, for 
example, selecting ambitious abatement policies leads to large forgone investment costs. 
Thus policy makers are unlikely to revoke expensive strategies once they are implemented.   
 
In this thesis we focus on the uncertain time lag of benefits following nitrogen 
abatement. The time taken for abatement policies to lead to reductions in concentration 
levels of nitrogen in the sea are uncertain, hence benefits from nitrogen abatement are 
uncertain. Elofsson (2003) and Gren (2008c) have studied the stochastic relationship 
between abatement measures and the impact on nutrient loads. They find the covariance of 
nutrient loads in a region largely affect the abatement policy that should be employed, not 
accounting for this covariance can lead to under abatement. While Hökby and Söderqvist 
(2003) states that a 50% reduction of nitrogen loads, corresponds to a 30-50% reduction in 
concentration levels. However, no previous studies have focused on the uncertain time lag 
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of benefits following abatement. We contribute to this discussion by valuing perfect 
information regarding the uncertain benefits achieved through nitrogen reductions.  
 
The time taken for nutrients to be removed from the Baltic Sea can fluctuate 
between basins, due to the different residence times of the water among basins (HELCOM 
2009). If concentration levels fall quickly once nutrient reductions are made, then benefits 
will be received early. However, if concentration levels take a long time to adjust, benefits 
will be delayed. The literature is this field demonstrates the uncertainties faced. Savchuk and 
Wulff (1999) used a reduction scenario simulation to estimate the effects of a 50% load 
reduction to the Baltic Sea. They found that although the time scales for recovery could take 
decades, reductions of concentration levels were pronounced in Eastern Gulf of Finland after 
just two weeks. This is a unique case and caused by the short freshwater residence time of 
the basin, and thus does not apply to all basins.  While Stålnacke et al (2003) finds a large 
reduction of fertiliser and manure use, coupled with increased animal slaughtering in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, does not lead to a significant downward trend of nutrients 
during a 10 year period. Wulff et al (2007) models the response of the Baltic Sea to different 
management options, and finds it could be decades before any real change is seen. This 
highlights the inconsistencies in the literature, regarding outcomes of the sea following 
various abatement strategies. In this thesis we attempt to address this issue by using the 
quasi option model to determine the value of information on the uncertain time lag of 
benefits following abatement policy. This is where we attach a monetary value to this 
uncertainty.  
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Figure 1. Main basins of the Baltic Sea. 
Source: eoearth.org.  
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1.1 Purpose of Study  
Since abatement policy for the Baltic Sea is subject to both uncertainty and irreversibility, 
it is crucial governments of the surrounding countries are well informed before acting. The 
quasi option value method defines the time value of waiting until more information is 
received, before making expensive irreversible policy decisions. Our research will estimate 
the value of eliminating the uncertainty of the time lag of benefits after abatement, thus 
justifying if funding this research is beneficial. Therefore, our research question is as follows; 
what is the value of perfect scientific information concerning the uncertain time lag of 
benefits from nitrogen abatement? 
 
Our research is of value to the affected countries as well as HELCOM. We argue the low 
implementation of load reduction targets thus far, may be explained by countries rationally 
waiting to obtain more information about the benefits, before committing to expensive and 
irreversible polices. By valuing the uncertainty, this should motivate the affected parties to 
commit to abatement.  
 
We consider two types of abatement polices facing the nine surrounding countries of the 
Baltic Sea. This occurs over two time periods. One requires a large reduction in nitrogen, and 
is based on reduction requirements from HELCOM. This policy is assumed irreversible, so 
once taken in period one, must also be taken in period two. The other is a smaller reduction 
policy, and corresponds to the actual reductions made. We assume if this policy is taken in 
period one, we can in fact switch to a high level of abatement in period two.  Benefits from 
each policy are assumed to appear in two uncertain states of the world, one where benefits 
are received early, and the other where they are delayed. We use the net benefits under all 
policy options to calculate the quasi option value. The quasi option value here corresponds 
to the value of information from removing the uncertainty of being in a world with early or 
late benefits. 
 
Despite the successful use of the quasi option value method in numerous environmental 
problems, it has not been used to address uncertainties in the Baltic Sea. In fact, to the best 
of our knowledge, no previous literature has attempted to quantify the value of information 
concerning uncertainties in Baltic Sea policy. Therefore, our research makes a valid 
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contribution on a scientific basis. Looking at this research on a social perspective, 15 million 
people live within 10km of the Baltic coast (Sweitzer et al 1996). When algae decays, not 
only does it cause oxygen depletion, but it also drifts ashore with a pungent smell, and may 
produce toxic substances (Elofsson 2003). Therefore, this type of research is of particular 
importance to the people living around the Baltic Sea, who are ultimately the ones most 
affected by this pollution. Our findings may contribute to these countries implementing 
better informed abatement policies.  
 
Our research is limited to only considering nitrogen abatement, although both nitrogen 
and phosphorus cause harm to the Baltic Sea. This may therefore overestimate the benefits 
we achieve, since we assume all basins benefit from nitrogen reduction equally. 
Furthermore, the value of information is considered on an aggregate level. Although we find 
a high quasi option value, this does not necessarily mean all countries benefit to the same 
extent from having this information. This is a possible ethical issue of our research. Our 
answers may change if we consider the value of information separately for each country, 
with some countries benefiting less from this knowledge compared to others.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows, section 2 reports on the previous 
literature in this field. We consider studies that have looked at uncertain outcomes of 
abatement policy in the Baltic Sea, as well as the application of quasi option value in other 
fields of research. Section 3 outlines how we apply our work to the quasi option value 
model. Section 4 simply illustrates the methods we undertake to calculate costs and 
benefits, and how we will use this information to calculate the quasi option value. Section 5 
reports the results of our method. We conclude in section 6 with a discussion on the thesis.  
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2. Literature Review  
 Despite its equivalence to the value of information, no previous work has used 
the quasi option value method to value uncertainties in the Baltic Sea. There is however, a 
large body of literature that has looked at numerous uncertainties affecting the Baltic Sea, 
and how they affect policy choices. While the quasi option value model has been 
successfully incorporated in other fields of research.  
 
The uncertainty of the stochastic relationship between abatement measures and the 
corresponding impact on nutrient loads is explored in Elofsson (2003). This paper considers a 
model of point and non-point emission sources, to determine the cost effective solutions of 
nutrient load reductions to the Baltic Sea. The nutrient loads transported to the sea can vary 
over seasons and across years. They report some of the factors responsible for this 
difference include the inconsistency of precipitation and air temperature, while storms can 
increase the surface- relative to subsurface-runoff. The different uses of land are also 
another reason for this variability. The lack of information makes policy concerning the 
correct reduction load to implement subject to uncertainty. This study considers how the 
variance and covariance of loads from different regions affect cost effective abatement.  
 
They model a large watershed where pollution arises from point and non-point 
sources, point sources are located at the coast and deemed non-random, and by assumption 
have a variance of zero. Non-point sources instead are at a distance and stochastic, a 
fraction of these nutrients are retained (e.g. in soil or lost in air) when traveling to coastal 
waters. The fraction retained varies between regions, thus the final loads to coastal waters 
are uncertain. They determine the optimal level of abatement by solving a cost minimisation 
problem, with respect to different pollutant load reduction measures.     
 
Their results indicate that the cost of reducing nutrient loads by 50% can be 80% 
higher if the policy maker takes load variation into account. If the covariance of loads 
between regions are not considered, then costs could be underestimated by 20%. When 
loads from a region are negatively (positively) correlated, it becomes cost effective to reduce 
(increase) abatement in that region. This paper successfully highlights the importance of 
nutrient variations, and the corresponding effects on abatement policy. However, a point of 
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concern is that the researchers only consider a 50% reduction in nutrient loads. Therefore, 
the conclusions drawn may vary if other load reductions are considered. 
  
Gren (2008c) also considers the stochastic pollution of water. Similarly to Elofsson 
(2003), they account for the variability of emission sources, and retention of nutrients loads 
that lead to uncertain final loads in coastal waters. This paper looks at risk linkages between 
mitigation and adaptation strategies, where mitigation strategies are measures that reduce 
pollutants from the emission sources (e.g. cleaning at sewage treatment plants), and 
adaptation strategies correspond to pollutant load changes at the water recipient (e.g. 
wetlands). They define risk linkage as the covariance between the remaining pollutants after 
mitigation and adaptation measures. The purpose of this research is to determine the risk 
linkage of the two measures on cost effective solutions, accounting for stochastic loads to 
water recipients.  
 
 They separate the Baltic Sea into individual basins; mitigation measures imply 
decreases in upstream emissions, and are modelled stochastic due to climate conditions. 
Stochastic programming is used to calculate the optimal allocation of mitigation and 
adaptation measures, where the problem minimises the cost for pre-specified targets. The 
paper assumes that the objective of the policy maker is to minimise total abatement costs 
for achieving a certain target. An important limitation of this study is that their method 
disregards the dynamics of water pollution. This we know is an important factor, since the 
sea takes a long time to adjust to changes in loads, this is especially true for phosphorus 
(which takes longer than nitrogen).  
 
 Their results show that a positive covariance between nutrient loads decreases 
risk, and thus total cost, while negative covariance increases it. On an international 
perspective, countries are assumed not to consider reductions in covariance with other 
countries, therefore, total abatement may exceed that of an international target. This paper 
demonstrates the importance of considering other countries nutrients loads to avoid over 
abating, which is not cost effective.   
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 Previous literature suggests that employing nutrient reductions does not 
benefit all countries equally, with some countries not receiving net gains (Gren et al 1997a, 
Hyytiäinen et al 2013). In contrast, Gren (2003) finds that when accounting for uncertainty of 
the degradation of water following abatement policy of nitrogen, and hence abatement 
impacts following nitrogen abatement, all countries gain. Since all nine countries 
surrounding the Baltic Sea contribute to eutrophication, effective and efficient nitrogen 
reduction (marginal abatement costs are the same across the polluting countries) requires 
joint action.  
 
 Gren (2003) builds a model based on costs depending on the emission 
employed, and benefits depending on abatement in all countries. Net benefits are the 
maximum of the expected utility function (expected cost minus expected benefits). They use 
a quadratic utility function with a coefficient to measure risk aversion. This relates the 
expected benefits to risk (measured by variance in net benefits), and hence can be used to 
determine a full cooperative solution. Their results indicate that the higher the risk aversion, 
the lower the abatement, and the smaller the net benefits. Gren (2003) interrupts these 
findings to mean that although no country will lose from abatement, some countries reap 
substantially large benefits, motivating the possibility for redistribution schemes. A possible 
limitation of this study is the underestimation of benefits (benefits from biodiversity not 
considered), which may change the cooperative solution, possibly requiring more nitrogen 
abatement from all countries.   
 
 Other uncertainties from abatement policy in the Baltic Sea stems from the 
lack of overview in costs and benefits, and when it is appropriate to reduce only one nutrient 
as opposed to two. Wulff et al (2001) related the lack of reductions in nutrients to the lack of 
knowledge on large scale improvements. Gren (1997a) used a geographical information 
system (GIS) database to relate drainage basin data on nutrient loads, with the statistics of 
nutrient emissions for diﬀerent economic sectors. The reason being that country borders do 
not coincide with basin borders, thus making it difficult to acquire information on the 
economic activities generating the loads. The purpose of the paper was to quantify the 
uncertain monetary costs and benefits, following a 50% nutrient reduction in nitrogen and 
phosphorus. Gren (1997a) finds that costs and beneﬁts are more or less equal (benefits were 
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31527 million SEK annually, and costs were 31070 million SEK annually). While Elofsson 
(2006) found that factors like stringency of the environmental target, and the assumptions 
made concerning nutrient substitutability, determine the nutrient that should be reduced. 
 
 The above literature accounts for some of the uncertainties faced when considering 
abatement policy.  Our research question requires data on costs and benefits of abatement. 
It is therefore beneficial to review how previous studies have gathered their data, to direct 
our own data collection process. Gren (1997b) uses a cost function to find cost effective 
nutrient reductions using prices of abatement policies. They report a lack of data on market 
prices for all regions, therefore, data for the Swedish Baltic Proper region is transferred to all 
other countries. Of course this is a limitation of the data gathering process since it assumes 
that all regions are the same in terms of soil and climate conditions, when in reality they 
could differ. Nevertheless, collecting data on costs is often difficult and the literature has to 
assume estimates to gather this. Gren (2001) estimates nitrogen abatement costs through 
econometric estimates (for sewage treatment plants, fertiliser reductions, reductions of 
nitrogen oxides from reduced use of gas and oil, and wetland creation). This method is also 
employed in Gren and Folmer (2003) and Gren (2008c). Again results are applied to all other 
surrounding countries.  
 
Benefits are usually calculated using consumer valuation models and willingness to 
pay for improvements to the Baltic Sea (see e.g. Gren 1997a, Turner 1999, Gren and Folmer 
2003). The data from consumer valuation models come directly from people’s responses to 
hypothetical questions (e.g. would you be willing to pay X for…?). This method is often 
criticised for only measuring revealed preferences, not stated preferences, therefore there is 
a risk that responses may be an exaggeration of the true answer. Willingness to pay is often 
used in environmental problems to value environmental resources (the value people place, 
is what the resource is worth).  
 
Although there is no literature that focuses on the time lag of benefits following 
abatement, it has been valuable to review literature that has considered other uncertainties 
to inform our own study. Likewise, the quasi option value method has not been modelled to 
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address uncertainties in the Baltic Sea. It has however, been successfully applied to other 
fields of research, validating it as a good model to value important environmental concerns.  
 
Quasi option value is used to describe the welfare gain or benefit associated with 
delaying a decision, when there is uncertainty about the payoffs of alternative choices, and 
when at least one of the choices involves the irreversible commitment of resources 
(Freeman 1984). This term was developed by Arrow and Fisher (1974), and later Conrad 
(1980) related this to the expected value of information in the presence of uncertainty. 
There is often a misconception between option value and quasi option value, and it is 
important to distinguish between the two. The concept of option value was first developed 
by Weisbrod (1964) and differs from quasi option value. Fisher (2000) states that option 
value is essentially static and related to risk aversion, and can be positive or negative. 
However, the quasi option value is not dependent on risk aversion, and is nonnegative. 
Option value is commonly used in environmental problems to value the preservation of 
natural resources (e.g. wilderness areas, wildlife habitats e.t.c), so they are available for 
future use.  
 
Ha-Duong (1998) uses the quasi option value to address uncertainties in climate 
policies. They state there needs to be a balance between investment irreversibility from over 
cautious policy, with accelerating mitigation policy, that is bound to proceed if a worst case 
scenario materialises. To explore this balance, they define a quasi option value for a 
precautionary climate policy and relate this to the expected value of information. They 
consider a two stage decision process to be taken in year 2000, and long term choice to be 
taken in 2020. In order to implement the quasi option value model, they define two 
alternative policy options; one with strict abatement, and one with lower abatement 
remaining close to business as usual. However, this is a large assumption since in reality 
more than two policies are available. They assume that environmental impacts can be either 
high or low, and depend on a stochastic variable with probability p and (1-p) of low 
damages. The calculation of quasi option value is determined as a proportion of opportunity 
cost, where they find it to be significant, amounting to 50% of the cost. Their results support 
large benefits in purchasing insurance against climate change by early action to mitigate 
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greenhouse gas emissions. This study demonstrates how the quasi option value model can 
be effectively used to address irreversible environmental policies.  
 
Magnan et al (2011) also uses the quasi option value in climate policy to demonstrate 
how no-till agriculture, a technology that delays input use, creates a quasi option value for 
farmers faced with the possibility of catastrophic drought. The technology allows farmers to 
abandon their crop in response to drought before making late season investments, thus 
creating a quasi option value. They distinguish between flexible and inflexible farmers, 
where inflexible farmers maximise net benefits with no consideration for stochastic rainfall. 
They calculate the quasi option value as the difference in profit between conventional tiling, 
and no-till agriculture for flexible farmers. They find that quasi option value makes up a large 
portion of the total cost saving offered by the technology.  
 
Costello and Kolstad (2015) argue that using the quasi option value as a tax in a 
‘timing of extraction problem’ (where extraction entails environmental damage), can stop a 
naïve decision maker prematurely mining before waiting for more information. They state 
that when environmental damage is known, the socially optimal time to mine will depend on 
the damage incurred, compared to the rest of the world. However, in the case of uncertain 
damage costs, this information is only revealed over time, motivating a mine owner to defer 
mining until more information is received, thus creating a quasi option value. This is a 
limitation of their work since they disregard any other factors that could also determine the 
optimal time to mine. They distinguish between a naïve and sophisticated mine owner, 
where the naïve owner does not account for environmental externalities (excludes social 
costs). They find that by imposing the quasi option value as a tax in the first period, this 
stops a naïve decision maker from acting too rash, they conclude this is because the cost of 
prematurely mining will become too high.  
 
The literature reviewed here reiterates the importance of our research and can 
substantially aid in formulating our thesis. In particular, these studies clearly highlight that 
uncertainties regarding load reductions, and nutrient loads, extends beyond just time lag, 
our primary focus. It further demonstrates how different models can be used to address 
these areas. Reviewing how previous literature have obtained their data and understanding 
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the constraints and limitations of this, will aid us in selecting appropriate methods and make 
valid assumptions when necessary. While studies using the quasi option value validate this 
model when applied to environmental problems. The clear approach of Ha-Duong (1998) is 
of particular interest to us. We too outline two polices that can be undertaken, one with 
strict abatement and one using low levels of abatement. Benefits will materialise in two 
different states of the world, where like Ha-Duong, we attach probabilities p and 1-p.  
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3. Model Framework 
The quasi option value developed by Arrow and Fisher (1974), was originally built on 
the premise of selecting between preserving or developing an area of natural environment. 
The decision to develop is irreversible, and is taken under uncertainty with regards to the 
associated future costs and benefits (that developing and preserving entail). The model 
considers two time periods; period one (now), and the period two (future). There is 
imperfect knowledge of future outcomes, although the decision maker has all relevant 
information concerning period one, period two outcomes are uncertain. At the start of 
period one, all possible period two outcomes can be listed with their associated 
probabilities. Choosing to develop or preserve is taken at the start of period one, however, it 
is only at the end of this period that complete knowledge about period two will be realised. 
Therefore, waiting until period two would provide better information.  
 
Arrow and Fisher (1974) state that expected benefits of an irreversible decision 
requires adjustment, this is to account for the loss of option it causes. The size of this 
adjustment is the quasi option value, and thus reflects the value of delaying irreversible 
policy decisions until more information is known (end of period one). Consequently, this 
model is only relevant for situations where decisions involve uncertainty, and where at least 
one policy option is irreversible.   
 
We apply this model in our thesis to value information regarding the uncertain time 
lag of benefits, and thus determine which state of the world we are in (one with early or late 
benefits). It calculates the expected payoff from waiting to obtain more information, before 
enforcing a high and expensive abatement policy, which we argue is irreversible. 
 
We could employ other methods to calculate the value of information. Lave (1963) 
related the quantity of raisins to the number of degree days using regression analysis (how 
much crop can be dried before rain), to determine the effects of better weather information 
to Californian raisin growers. If we too followed this method, it would allow us to capture 
the causal relationship between benefits and abatement policy. Benefits become the 
dependent variable, while abatement policy is the independent variable. A dummy variable 
to indicate if there is high or low abatement policy, along with a dummy variable to capture 
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early or late benefits could be used. Nevertheless, there are numerous explanatory variables 
we must account for to avoid causing bias in the regression, these cannot all be quantified 
and kept constant.  
 
Bayesian networks are also a method that is being used to calculate value of 
information, it involves determining the relationship among important variables in a system 
of interest (Borsuk 2004). The variables are represented by nodes, where arrows are used to 
show conditional probability, highlighting the relationship among the variables.  In terms of 
the Baltic Sea, it is difficult to determine the most important variables that affect the 
distribution of early and late benefits. This method cannot be applied in this thesis, since we 
must identify the most dominant variables that affect large and small abatement policy, and 
the corresponding effects on benefits. There are a lot of variables (see section 2) that affect 
this, and are hard to measure and assign probabilities to. Furthermore, this model cannot 
consider changing policy after period one, where a low abatement policy can be followed by 
a large one. Therefore, we argue that the quasi option value is the most appropriate method 
to use. 
 
3.1 Application of Model     
We focus solely on nitrogen abatement and define two abatement policies that can 
be undertaken by all nine bordering countries, under two time periods. The first involves a 
high level of abatement, which is considered to be irreversible, we label this A+. If this policy 
is selected in period one, period two must also incorporate this policy. Whereas, policy A- is 
a low level of abatement and if selected in period one, can be changed to a higher level of 
abatement in period two. We assume we are at the start of period one, and must make a 
decision between the two policies, where information on the uncertain time lag of benefits 
is attained at the end of this period (Figure 2).   
 
The quasi option value method is limited to assuming only two policy options, this is 
of course a disadvantage of the model, since in reality policy makers have a choice between 
multiple decisions. However, to keep our model simple we can only account for high and low 
abatement. Furthermore, this model requires analysing the outcomes of these policies over 
only two time periods (now and future), again this is a limitation and abstracts away from 
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reality, where there can be multiple time periods to analyse policy. However, this would 
make the calculations far too complicated, and execution not practical if more than two time 
periods are considered. Therefore, for feasibility we should make this assumption.  
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Figure 2. Decision tree showing all combinations of policy options available and corresponding outcomes in the 
two states of the world that could materialise.  
A+, high abatement; A-, low abatement; E, early benefit; L, late benefit. 
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3.2 Calculation of the Quasi Option Value  
          To determine the quasi option value, we calculate the expected and expectation value 
of net benefits from high and low abatement. The difference between the expectation and 
expected value is the quasi option value. This reflects the value of information to eliminate 
the uncertainty of time lag of benefits. All strategies enforced have their own unique return 
associated with the investment (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Combination of possible strategies and associated returns. 
Policy 
Option Period One Period Two Return 
1 A+ A+ 
 
2 A- A- 
 
3 A- A+ 
 
 
 , benefit of strategy A+ in period one 
 , cost of strategy A+ is period one 
 , net benefit of strategy A++ in period two 
 , benefit of strategy A- in period one,  
, cost of strategy A- in period one 
 , net benefit of strategy A-- in period two 
  net benefit of strategy A-+ in period two 
 
 
Note from Table 1, that the net benefit of strategy A- in period one is 
common to both policy two and three. The return to the decision maker in period one from 
enforcing strategy A- is  or , depending on whether or not a large abatement is 
initiated in period two, given the information then available. If the net benefit of strategy A-- 
is higher than A-+ ( ), then the decision maker will enforce this policy (vice 
versa).  
 
             The benefits of following strategy A++ is simply as shown in Equation 1, and Table 1. 
 
                                               [1] 
 
The benefit of following strategy A- is Equation 2, depending on which policy is 
enforced in period two. The ‘Max’ is short for whichever is the largest term in the brackets to 
be selected.  
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     [2] 
 
If we assume that the decision maker has complete knowledge for the relevant 
future circumstances, hence all future costs and benefits are known, then the decision 
maker will also know  ,  and . The decision maker will enforce strategy A++ 
if . Using Equation 1 and 2, we can construct the following 
Equation 3. This states that strategy A++ will be followed as long as 
 
 
       [3] 
 
However, we know that Equation 3 cannot be known to the decision maker at the 
start of period one, due to the uncertain outcome of period two. Instead, we assume 
outcomes may be known to the decision maker, where he or she can attach probabilities to 
these mutually exclusive events. It is therefore intuitive to replace Equation 3 with the 
corresponding expected values and expectations. Equation 4 uses the expected values. 
 
   [4] 
 
       Although Equation 4 takes into account that outcomes are not in fact known to the 
decision maker at the start of period one (unlike Equation 3), it still disregards the fact that 
more information will become available in period two. If a high level of abatement is 
selected in period one, then the new information cannot be used. Taking the expectation of 
Equation 3 does take this into account, this is shown in Equation 5. 
 
         [5] 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
The difference between Equation 5 and 4 is simply the quasi option value, 
note  is common to both equations so this 
can cancel out, as shown in Equation 6.  
 
                        
[6] 
 
We assume two possible period two scenarios. State one is that benefits are received 
early (with probability p), while the second state is that benefits are delayed (with 
probability (1-p)). We need to calculate Equation 4 and 5 for these two states  
 
 
Equation 4a states under what condition strategy A++ will be taken, using expected 
values to calculate the benefits under each strategy.  is equal to the early benefits of 
strategy A++ in period two,  is late benefits of strategy A++. It follows that  is 
early benefits of strategy A-- in period two,  is late benefits of strategy A--. Finally, 
 is the early benefits of strategy A-+ in period two, while late benefits of 
strategy A-+ in period two. Equation 5a states under what condition strategy A++ will be 
taken using expectations.  
 
         [4a] 
 
 
 
        [5a] 
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Subtracting Equation 4a from 5a will give us the quasi option value, leading to 
Equation 6a. This is the quasi option value, and what we want to calculate for the net 
benefits of nitrogen reduction.  
 
        [6a] 
 
 
3.3 Assumptions About Timing of Policy 
We motivate the selection of time periods in terms of irreversibility of policy options. 
Pommeret and Prieur (2009) investigate the role of irreversibility in environmental policy. 
They state irreversibility takes two forms, one relates to the actual degradation of the 
environment, and the other to the sunk cost of environmental policy.  In terms of the Baltic 
Sea, selecting a low abatement policy may mean irreversible damage to the sea (or requires 
a very long time to fix). However, enforcing a high abatement policy is expensive, and the 
cost incurred here is sunk.   
 
We therefore assume that strategy A+ is irreversible, if this decision is made in period 
one, period two must enforce this policy as well. It cannot be revoked in the case more 
information comes to light, or conditions change. We relate this to the idea of the sunk cost 
of environmental policy. It would be logical to assume that enforcing a policy where a large 
abatement is required, would involve more investment in abatement technology than a less 
ambitious policy. As a result, the actual investment in technologies make the policy 
irreversible, since it would simply be too costly to change. Policy makers are therefore 
reluctant to change to a lower abatement strategy once they have invested sufficiently in 
high abatement. Policy A- requires a low level of abatement, hence lower investment, we 
assume after period one, we can in fact change strategies and implement A+. 
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We will use 25 years for each time period (and assume we are at the start of period 
one), where period one is from 1991 to 2015, while period two will run from 2016 to 2040. 
We further assume that early and late benefits can materialise with equal probability.  
 
 
3.4 Timing of Early and Late Benefits  
 
We relate benefits to the expected time taken for concentration levels to decrease 
following abatement. Hence, when levels decrease, benefits will increase. 
 
Savchuk and Wulff (2007) model the response of concentration levels in the Baltic 
Sea after full abatement of nitrogen and phosphorus.  They find that concentration levels of 
nitrogen take 20 years to reach a steady state. On the other hand, the response of dissolved 
inorganic nitrogen (sum of nitrate and ammonia) is much slower. Concentration levels are 
reported to follow a convex shape at the beginning, it is only after 20 to 30 years any form of 
reduction in concentration levels are seen. Stålnacke et al (2003) explore the decrease in 
fertiliser, extensive slaughtering of livestock, and reduced amount of manure use in Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania between 1987 and 1996. They measure the impact this reduction has 
on the concentrations of nutrients in Latvian rivers. Their results show that in the majority of 
basins examined, no statistically significant decrease (of nitrogen concentrations) is seen 
during 1987 and 1988.  
 
The combination of nitrogen and dissolved inorganic nitrogen from different sources 
are not well known, therefore, it is difficult to accurately determine the timing of benefits. 
We will use the two studies above to build our assumptions of time lag benefits. 
 
Assumption one: early benefits start after year 10. This is based on Stålnacke et al 
(2003) not observing a decrease in nitrogen concentration levels for the duration of 
their 10 year study. 
 
Assumption two: it takes 10 years to reach a steady benefit level. This is based on 
Stålnacke et al’s (2003) lack of observations of decreases in concentration levels for 
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the duration of their 10 year study, and Savchuk and Wulff (2007) observing a steady 
level of concentrations by year 20.  
 
During this 10 year period from when benefits first arise to when they reach a steady level, 
there will be a linear increase. 
 
Assumption three: late benefits start in year 25 (and reach steady level by year 35). 
We relate this to the time taken for dissolved inorganic nitrogen concentrations to 
decrease, as reported in Savchuk and Wulff (2007). 
 
 
Recall that period one and two both consist of 25 year time periods, meaning the 
costs of abatement are incurred over a 50 year horizon. However, the distribution of 
benefits exceeds this time horizon. We assume that a 25 year abatement policy will entail 
benefits for 25 years. Table 2 summarises the distribution of costs and benefits expected for 
each policy, under both early and late benefits.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the progression of early and late benefits for policy A++. The early 
benefits are represented by the blue line, and late benefits by the red. Early benefits start 
after year 10 (2000) and progress linearly to the stable level of A+ benefits in year 20 (2010). 
In period two (2016) where the same policy is initiated, this continues the steady levels of 
benefits for an additional 25 years (2060). After this point, (when there is no more benefits 
from abatement) benefits begin to decrease back to zero, we assume this occurs at the same 
rate they increased, therefore taking 10 years to reach zero benefits. This is seen in year 70 
(2060). Late benefits on the other hand start after year 25 (2015), they too take 10 years to 
reach the steady level of benefits A+. In this scenario, the high abatement strategy enforced 
in period two (2016), only materialises after 25 years (year 50 (2040)), thereby continuing 
the steady level of benefits until year 75 (2065). Again, once all benefits from abatement are 
reaped, they fall back to zero (by year 85 (2075)).  
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Table 2. Distribution of costs and early/late benefits for all policies. Early benefits start after 10 years of abating 
and last for 25 years. Late benefits arrive after 25 years of abating and last for 25 years. 
  
Policy Time Period  Costs Benefits 
Ea
rly
 B
en
ef
its
 
A++ 
1 
Year 1-25 Year 11-35 at A+ 
(1991-2015) (2001-2025) 
2 
Year 26-50 Year 36-60 at A+ 
(2016-2040) (2026- 2050) 
A-- 
1 
Year 1-25 Year 11-35 at A- 
(1991-2015) (2001-2025) 
2 
Year 26-50 Year 36-60 at A- 
(2016-2040) (2026- 2050) 
A-+ 
1 
Year 1-25 Year 11-35 at A- 
(1991-2015) (2001-2025) 
2 
Year 26-50 Year 36-60 at A+ 
(2016-2040) (2026-2050) 
          
La
te
 B
en
ef
its
 
A++ 
1 
Year 1-25 Year 26-50 at A+ 
(1991-2015) (2016-2040) 
2 
Year 26-50 Year 51-75 at A+ 
(2016-2040) (2041-2065) 
A-- 
1 
Year 1-25 Year 26-50 at A- 
(1991-2015) (2016-2040) 
2 
Year 26-50 Year 51-75 at A- 
(2016-2040) (2041-2065) 
A-+ 
1 
Year 1-25 Year 26-50 at A- 
(1991-2015) (2016-2040) 
2 
Year 26-50 Year 51-75 at A+ 
(2016-2040) (2041-2065) 
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Figure 3. Progression of early and late benefits for policy option A++. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Progression of early and late benefits for policy option A--. 
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Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of early and late benefits under policy A--, notice it mirrors 
the distribution of Figure 3. However, only the stable level of A- benefits is reached, 
naturally, this is much lower than A+ benefits.  
 
Figure 5 shows the progression of early and late benefits following abatement policy 
A-+, the blue line corresponding to early benefits, and the red to late benefits. Again early 
benefits materialise after year 10 (2000), and reach a steady benefit level by year 20 (2020). 
However, now a high abatement policy is initiated in period two (2016), taking 10 years to 
materialise. This is shown in Figure 5 by the upward sloping line after year 35 (2025). After 
this point a new higher A+ steady level benefit is reached, this continues until year 60 
(2050), before falling back to zero in year 70 (2060), once all benefits are obtained. Late 
benefits follow the same distribution as early benefits, with the late benefit curve simply 
shifted to the right. Benefits start after year 25 (2015) and reach a steady A- benefit in year 
35 (2025). The high abatement strategy enforced in period two does not materialise until 
year 50 (2040). Stable A+ benefits are now reached in year 60 (2050). 
 
It is important to note the benefits we will achieve in our calculations are largely 
affected by the timing of early and late benefits we assume. As a result, the quasi option 
value we find will also be sensitive to changes in the expectation, of when these benefits are 
likely to materialise. This is of course a limitation of this process. However, we have 
conducted an extensive literature search, and tired our best to base the timing of early and 
late benefits on the literature and evidence available.   
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Figure 5. Progression of early and late benefits for policy 
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4. Methods and Applications 
This section will explain how we will collect and calculate the costs and benefits 
following abatement of nitrogen.  
 
4.1 Data 
 We assume that strategy A+ is one where all countries comply with the BSAP, which 
can be found on the HELCOM homepage, and shown in Table 3. This is the proposed country 
allocated reduction targets set. On the other hand, strategy A- are the actual reductions 
according to HELCOM PLC5 (HELCOM 2011), and are also presented in table 3. This displays 
the difference in emissions, hence reductions made between 2006-2008 and 1997-2003.  
 
Table 3. Country allocated reductions according to HELCOM and actual reductions according to HELCOM PLC5 
(Pollution Load Compilation 5, ch 5, flow normalised annual reductions: difference 2006-2008 to 1997-2003). 
Source: helcom.fi, HELCOM (2011). 
Country BSAP Nitrogen Reduction Targets (tonnes) 
Actual Reduction of 
Nitrogen (tonnes) 
Denmark 17,210 12,138 
Estonia 900 -5,790 
Finland 1,200 -5,635 
Germany 5,620 635 
Latvia 2,560 -18,167 
Lithuania 11,750 6,085 
Poland 62,400 -2,187 
Russia 6,970 -5,374 
Sweden 20,780 5,247 
 
 
 
To obtain data on costs we will use a cost function from Elofsson (2006), which 
calculates the cost of abatement using reductions employed, separately for each nine 
bordering countries. We insert the required reductions as shown in Table 3 into the cost 
function, and achieve costs for all years from 1991 until 2040. Some of the actual reductions 
taken as shown in Table 3 column 3, are recorded with minus, this is simply because these 
countries have failed to reduce loads (between 2006-2008 and 1997-2003). Therefore, we 
will record their reductions as zero in the cost function. This will mean these countries do 
not entail any costs from abatement, since they have not abated. We do not consider that 
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these countries may have in fact abated, but possible growth in their markets has led to an 
increase in the demand for nitrogen.     
 
To collect data on benefits, we assume a downward sloping demand curve for 
nitrogen reduction. By employing a method used in Gren et al (2009), and taking elasticity of 
nitrogen reduction from Hökby and Söderqvist (2003), we integrate the demand curve to 
give us the associated consumer surplus. A consumer surplus arises when there is a 
difference between the price that consumers are willing to pay in the market (hence the 
value placed on the product by the consumer), and the actual price. This is an economic 
measure of satisfaction and calculates the welfare gain from consuming the good. Therefore, 
this corresponds to the annual aggregate benefits from abatement.  
 
4.2 Calculation of Costs  
The cost function we use is;  (Elofsson 2006),  
where  is equal to costs (expressed in million SEK) and  is equal to initial emissions, 
while  are current emissions. Therefore,  is equal to the reductions employed 
(which will be taken from Table 3). Elofsson (2006) further defines quantities for  and  
unique for each country as shown in Table 4. By inserting these parameters into the cost 
function, we will obtain separate costs for each country.  We assume the costs incurred are 
the same every year (from 1991 until 2040). To account for the time value of money, we 
discount back to the start of period one (1991). We can then aggregate the costs of all 
countries in each time period and convert into euros using 1 SEK= 0.11 EUR, correct as of 
12/04/16.  
 
 The assumption that costs are the same in every period disregards the fact that 
costs may in fact decrease over time, due knowledge diffusion and technological innovation. 
Generally, costs decrease over time, the rate at which they decrease however, depends on 
the innovation of technology and how this relates back to abatement costs. This is difficult to 
measure and incorporate, therefore, we believe our assumption is valid.  
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Table 4. Coefficients of cost function. 
Source: Elofsson (2006). 
Country Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Latvia Lithuania Poland Russia Sweden 
 β1 -15.190 -13.889 -16.092 -12.507 -18.007 -17.807 -18.433 -4.804 -11.940 
  β2 2.395 2.192 2.380 2.167 2.580 2.579 2.460 1.155 1.896 
 
  
 
 
 4.3 Calculation of Benefits 
                We need to formulate a benefit function in order to measure the gain from 
abatement. Gren et al (2009) uses an inverse demand function to calculate the control costs 
of decreases in emissions from reductions in energy users. They determine this by 
integrating the demand curve to find the change in consumer surplus (which is equal to 
benefits), following deviations from ‘business as usual’ points (costs are calculated as 
associated decreases in consumer surplus).  
 
Figure 6 shows a downward sloping demand curve for nitrogen reduction which is 
equal to the marginal benefits from abatement. The marginal benefits of abatement are 
subject to diminishing returns, this simply means that abating one more unit while holding 
everything else constant, will yield a lower benefit than the last unit. This is the reason we 
have a downward sloping marginal benefit curve. The marginal cost curve is upward sloping 
since we know that the more units we abate, the more expensive this will be. In 
environmental problems, it may seem that abating fully is optimal, however this is not the 
case. After a certain point, the marginal cost of reducing the pollutant exceeds the marginal 
benefit (Buchanan 1965). Instead an equilibrium is reached when marginal costs are equal to 
marginal benefits (Buchanan 1965). Consequently, Figure 6 shows that optimal abatement 
quantity is point A* 
 
We make the assumption that when HELCOM designed the BSAP (Table 3 column 2), 
they in fact equated the marginal costs and benefits from abatement to decide the load 
reductions to set. Thus point A* in Figure 6 corresponds to the aggregate nitrogen 
reductions of the BSAP (hence strategy A+). Of course there is a limitation to this 
assumption, although economically speaking it is correct to determine load reductions in this 
manner, in reality this method is not employed. HELCOM determines load reductions by 
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estimating the maximum allowable inputs of nutrients to reach the eutrophication target of 
clear water, they do this using SANDBALT (model developed by MARE research program in 
Sweden). These maximum allowable targets and are then used in combination with agreed 
allocation principles to determine the load reductions.  
 
Marginal costs are calculated by differentiating our cost function, which corresponds 
to the point  in Figure 6. Hökby and Söderqvist (2003) look at the demand function for 
nitrogen reduction, they find that the price elasticity of demand for nitrogen reductions is -
1.86, i.e. demand is relatively elastic, implying a slow decrease in marginal benefits. Using all 
these points will allow us to follow the method used in Gren et al (2009) to calculate our 
benefits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost (MC) curve of nitrogen abatement. 
                
 Equation 7 is the marginal cost function and derived from the cost function we are 
using. Please refer to Appendix 1 for full calculations. The country with the highest marginal 
costs will be used as the point . This is simply because the benefits we are calculating are 
on an aggregate level, therefore, in order to abate marginal cost cannot be higher than 
marginal benefit, we must use the country with the highest marginal cost to ensure there is 
abatement.   
 
MB/MC  
 
A* 
 
Nitrogen Abatement  
D=MB 
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                        [7],          where                                                                         
 
 
Equation 8 shows the benefit function we calculate, where  refers to the quantity 
abated and and  are coefficients of interest. Please refer to Appendix 2 for complete 
calculations for deriving the benefit function.   
 
                          [8] 
  
By inserting the quantity abated into the Equation 8 ( ), we achieve the 
corresponding annual stable benefit. We assume these benefits are the same every year. 
Therefore, we must discount benefits after 1991 back to the start of period one (1991). This 
is the aggregated benefits, and hence calculates the benefits of abatement for all nine 
countries. A limitation of this method is that we cannot determine which country gains the 
most benefit from abating, it is very unlikely that benefits are distributed equally across 
countries. 
 
In addition to this, the benefits we achieve by inserting abatement into Equation 8, 
corresponds to the stable benefits (as seen by the flat lines in Figures 3, 4, and 5). However, 
we will assume that benefits received prior to the steady level change linearly, as shown in 
the upward sloping lines in Figures 3, 4, and 5 (between year 10 and 20 for early benefits, 
and year 25 and 35 for late benefits). Please see Appendix 2.1 for an explanation of 
calculations. 
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4.4 Discounting Costs and Benefits 
Since we are assuming we are at the start of period one (1991), costs and benefits 
after this date are a future value and must be discounted back to the present value. To do 
this we simply need to use the formula below. Costs and benefits in each year are 
discounted separately before they are aggregated and converted into EUR.  
                              
Where PV, present value; FV, future value; i, discount rate; t, time (year). 
 
4.4.1 Selecting a Discount Rate  
Discounting takes into account the time perspective of money and the opportunity 
cost of the resources used in a project. People tend to value consumption today more than 
in the future. This is because of the pure time preference, for example, the same amount of 
money today is worth more than in the future, due to its capacity to earn interest. This leads 
to an opportunity cost of spending money now. The value the discount rate should be set at 
is a controversial matter, setting a positive discount rate values the future less than today, 
the higher this rate is, the lower the value placed. Hence, a positive discount rate would 
mean the value of future benefit streams is reduced compared to the same benefit in 
present time.  Only a discount rate of zero would mean equal value being assigned to the 
future and present. The choice of discount rate will influence our values of costs and 
benefits, and hence the quasi option value (the larger the discount rate employed, the lower 
the future costs and benefits).  
 
                    Generally, the Ramsey formula is used to determine the discount rate to use, it 
relates the discount rate to the growth rate of consumption, as shown below. 
 
Where r, discount rate; ρ, utility discount rate (pure time preference); η, elasticity of 
marginal utility w.r.t. to consumption; g, growth rate of consumption.  
 
It is sometimes recommended that environmental policy should be discounted using 
the rate employed in the Stern Review. This was a report conducted on the economics of 
climate change using a rate of 2.1% with ρ = 0.1%, η = 1, and g = 2% (Nordhaus 2007). 
However, this can be criticised for being too low. Lindqvist et al (2013) uses a discount rate 
of 3% to analyse the impact of technical change through learning by doing in the Baltic Sea. 
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The British Treasury (HM Treasury 2003) also advices that projects between 31 and 75 years 
should employ a 3% discount rate. Therefore, we will use 3%.  
 
The selection of the discount rate is generally considered an ethical issue since we 
are valuing the future. By implementing a positive discount rate, we are in fact valuing the 
future less than the present (the higher the rate the lower the value placed). Some 
economists argue that a zero discount rate should be used. There is a large body of literature 
that contributes to this ethical issue, Groom et al (2005) looks at the idea of inter-
generational equity. The present generation have a moral obligation to protect future 
generations, since they cannot express their preferences. Therefore, a precautionary 
principle should be enforced. Nordhaus (2007) argues that future generations should be able 
to make the same choices as present generations. To account for this, I will conduct 
sensitivity analysis to determine how the quasi option value changes using a discount rate of 
zero. 
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5. Results  
We will now present the results of our method starting with the discounted 
aggregated costs, followed by discounted aggregated benefits, and finally the calculation of 
the quasi option value.  
 
5.1 Results of Aggregated Costs 
The costs of all three policy options in both time periods are displayed in Table 5 and 
6. Table 5 shows to abate the level A+, it would cost all nine countries a combined amount of 
23.7 billion EUR during 1991-2015. Denmark and Poland take on the largest costs, since they 
are allocated to reduce the most. In the time period 2016-2040, to continue enforcing 
strategy A+, it will cost 11.3 billion EUR. 
  
Table 5. Discounted aggregated country costs of strategy A++ in EUR (1991-2015 and 2016-2040). 
Country Discounted Aggregate Costs 1991-2015 
Discounted Aggregate 
Costs 2016-2040 
Denmark 6,964,167,335 3,326,125,104 
Estonia 5,481,390 2,617,942 
Finland 4,314,115 2,060,446 
Germany 975,134,909 465,729,863 
Latvia 18,536,408 8,853,091 
Lithuania 1,143,544,349 546,163,150 
Poland 12,187,400,950 5,820,770,569 
Russia 444,314,372 212,207,018 
Sweden 1,976,455,449 943,966,130 
   Total Cost 23,719,349,276 11,328,493,314 
 
 
Table 6 shows the cost for implementing abatement under policy A-- and A-+. We can 
see in period one, the cost of initiating low abatement is 3.4 billion EUR, with Denmark 
taking the highest cost burden. Some countries are recorded as having zero costs (Estonia, 
Finland, Latvia, Poland and Russia), this is simply because these countries do not abate under 
strategy A-, and therefore do not incur costs. If this same policy is continued in period two, it 
would entail a cost of 1.6 billion EUR. However, if in period two the policy maker decides to 
start abating a high level, this would increase costs to 11.3 billion EUR.   
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Table 6. Discounted aggregated country costs of strategy A--and A-+in EURS (1991-2015 and 2016-2040). 
Country Discounted Aggregate Costs 1991-2015 (A-) 
Discounted Aggregate 
Costs 2016-2040 (A-) 
Discounted Aggregate 
Costs 2016-2040 (A+) 
Denmark 3,017,910,786 1,441,370,999 3,326,125,104 
Estonia 0 0 2,617,942 
Finland 0 0 2,060,446 
Germany 8,649,615 4,131,104 465,729,863 
Latvia 0 0 8,853,091 
Lithuania 209,523,817 100,069,742 546,163,150 
Poland 0 0 5,820,770,569 
Russia 0 0 212,207,018 
Sweden 145,406,043 69,446,736 943,966,130 
    Total 
Cost 
3,381,490,261 1,615,018,581 11,328,493,314 
 
 
 Period two costs of A++ and A-+ are the same. This is because we have 
assumed there are no gains to be reaped from enforcing a higher level of abatement in 
period one (in terms of A++). Thus, the cost of policies is not affected by previous policies 
installed. It can be argued this assumption may be flawed since having a high abatement 
policy in period one should entail some cost benefits for the next period, e.g. in terms of 
technological innovation and learning by doing. However, it is difficult to determine how 
these benefits are translated to a decrease in costs. 
 
5.2 Results of Aggregated Benefits  
Recall from Figure 6 that a cost effective solution requires equating the marginal cost 
and marginal benefit. The corresponding X-axis value is the quantity, and in our case the 
quantity abated, while the Y-axis is the price. We assumed the A* was the amount advised 
by HELCOM in the BSAP, this is simply 129,390 tonnes of nitrogen (summing up column 2 of 
Table 3).  
 
We calculated the marginal cost function as Equation 7 (see Appendix 1). We simply 
enter the parameters from Table 3 and 4 into this function to achieved marginal costs for 
each country in EUR.  
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Table 7. Marginal cost of strategy A+ in EUR.  
Country Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Latvia Lithuania Poland Russia Sweden 
Marginal 
Cost 54,036 744 477 20,964 1,042 13,994 26,788 4,105 10,055 
  
 
As we can see from Table 7, the highest marginal cost of abatement belongs to 
Denmark, therefore, we will use this marginal cost to formulate our benefit function 
(corresponding to the point on Y-axis on Figure 6). Recall from section 4.3, that we must use 
the country with the highest marginal cost, since our benefit function is considered on an 
aggregate level, and so abatement is considered on an aggregate level (for all nine countries 
including Denmark to abate, marginal cost cannot be higher than marginal benefit). We are 
now in a position to integrate the demand curve for nitrogen reduction, to find the 
corresponding benefits of abatement.  
 
Our benefit function was simply Equation 8. Please see Equations A9 and A10 in 
Appendix 2 for calculating  and . By inserting the load reductions made, we find the 
corresponding benefits. Our calculations show that  = 370055.4 and 0.489922071. 
 
Policy A+: we insert 129,390 (summing column 2 of Table 3). This gives us the 
aggregated annual benefits of 8.9 billion EUR. This is the expected stable annual benefit that 
should be achieved by all nine countries combined if policy A+ is used.  
 
Policy A-: we insert 24,105 (summing reductions from column 3 of Table 3). 
This gives us the aggregated annual benefits of 1.9 billion EUR. This is the stable expected 
annual benefit that should be achieved by all nine countries if policy A- is used.  
 
Recall that we assumed a linear relationship while benefits were increasing. We 
assumed it takes 10 years to reach a stable level of benefits, this we refer to as increasing 
benefits. We also assumed it takes 10 years for benefits to reach zero once stable benefits 
have stopped, this we refer to as decreasing benefits. Table 8 shows the expected benefits 
from increasing and decreasing benefits in EUR (without discounting). Note that the two 
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types of benefits are simply in reverse. This is because we assume benefits increase and 
decrease at the same rate.   
 
Table 8. Increasing and decreasing benefits of A+ and A- in EUR. 
Year
0 0 0 8,871,133,370 1,937,578,739
1 887,113,337 193,757,874 7,984,020,033 1,743,820,865
2 1,774,226,674 387,515,748 7,096,906,696 1,550,062,991
3 2,661,340,011 581,273,622 6,209,793,359 1,356,305,117
4 3,548,453,348 775,031,496 5,322,680,022 1,162,547,243
5 4,435,566,685 968,789,370 4,435,566,685 968,789,370
6 5,322,680,022 1,162,547,243 3,548,453,348 775,031,496
7 6,209,793,359 1,356,305,117 2,661,340,011 581,273,622
8 7,096,906,696 1,550,062,991 1,774,226,674 387,515,748
9 7,984,020,033 1,743,820,865 887,113,337 193,757,874
10 8,871,133,370 1,937,578,739 0 0
Increasing Decreasing
Policy
A+ A- A+ A-
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5.2.1 Results of Early and Late Benefits  
  Table 9 sums up the early and late benefits achieved in both time periods for 
all policy options. Policy A-- and A-+ have the same benefits in period one, this is because 
both policies are abating the lower level and will therefore reap the same benefits. 
Naturally, the highest benefits are achieved from strategy A++. Notice there are no late 
benefits in period one since benefits do not materialise until period two. Late benefits are of 
course much lower than early benefits since they appear later, and once discounted to the 
start of period one, are worth less than benefits that may appear earlier. 
 
Table 9. Discounted early benefits and late benefits of policy A++, A--, A-+ in EUR.  
Policy Period one Period 2 Total
A++ 51,294,081,398 94,441,931,013 145,736,012,411
A-- 11,377,685,124 21,214,951,830 32,592,636,954
A-+ 11,377,685,124 61,488,868,804 72,866,553,928
A++ 0 98,654,772,961 98,654,772,961
A-- 0 21,547,572,629 21,547,572,629
A-+ 0 48,173,376,251 48,173,376,251
Ea
rly
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5.3 Results of Quasi Option Value 
Figure 7 is similar to Figure 2 but we have included the results from Table 5, 6, 8, and 
9. We are now in a position to calculate the quasi option value using Equation 6a from 
section 3.2. Using this equation, we find a quasi option value of 8,622,474,844 EUR. This 
means that value of information concerning whether benefits are received early or late from 
abatement is worth over 8.6 billion EUR to all governments. This is the value of waiting until 
period two to receive more information, before implementing irreversible abatement policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Decision tree showing all combinations of policy options available and corresponding discounted 
results in the two states of the world that could materialise.  
A+, high abatement; A-, low abatement; E, early benefit; L, late benefit. 
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5.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
We will now conduct some sensitivity analysis to see how our answers may change. 
Two main things could affect our results; the first is the discount rate we select, and the 
second being when early benefits are expected to materialise. We will run our formulations 
again with an interest rate of zero. Naturally, by using a discount rate of zero, the annual 
aggregated costs and benefits are the same in both periods (depending on which strategy is 
implemented). The costs of all policy options (A++, A--, A-+) are higher as shown in Table A1 
and A2 in Appendix 3.  Benefits are also higher since we are not valuing the future less than 
the present, this can be seen in Table A3 of Appendix 3. We find the quasi option value 
becomes 66.6 billion EUR. The quasi option value is higher using a discount rate of zero, 
making the value of information higher, this is understandable since the future benefits are 
not discounted. This reveals that the lower the rate we apply in discounting, the higher the 
value of information.  
 
 We also consider early benefits materialising in year 0, while the timing of late 
benefits does not change. Table A4 in Appendix 3 shows the expected early benefits. The 
quasi option now becomes 10 billion EUR. Intuitively; it is more valuable to have knowledge 
about the state of the world when early benefits are expected to occur earlier, rather than 
later. This is understandable since the benefits from abatement will be higher if benefits 
occur earlier (due to discounting).  
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our thesis was built on the premise of irreversible abatement policy, where we 
formulated two policy options; high abatement of nitrogen was assumed irreversible. We 
assumed two uncertain states of the world; one in which benefits were received early, and 
one where they were delayed. We created two time periods (now and the future), where 
the decision to undertake high or low abatement was made at the start of period one. 
However, information regarding the time lag of benefits was only visible at the end of period 
one. Using a cost function derived by Elofsson (2006), we determined the annual costs 
associated with both policy options. Benefits were calculated by integrating the demand 
curve for nitrogen reduction, to obtain the consumer surplus. We then used the quasi option 
value method to calculate the value of information. 
 
We estimate the quasi option value of early information to be worth over 8.6 billion 
EUR, to all boarding countries of the Baltic Sea. This is the value attained from delaying 
irreversible decision making until more information is available, and hence the value of 
knowing which uncertain state of the world we are in. 
 
6.1 Uncertainties Regarding Abatement 
The quasi option value model has not been previously used to address uncertainty in 
the Baltic Sea, despite its successful application to numerous other environmental problems. 
Elofsson (2003) and Gren (2008c) study the uncertain, and stochastic relationship of 
abatement policy on nutrient loads. Similarly to our work, they motivate their research by 
highlighting the unclear outcomes of abatement policy. They both find the covariance of 
nutrient loads in a region (or country Gren (2008c)) largely affect the abatement policy that 
should be employed. Not accounting for covariance can often lead to underestimating costs, 
and diverging away from the cost effective abatement level. Our study builds on this 
research by determining how uncertain time lags affect abatement, focusing on the 
associated benefits from two uncertain states of the world. By valuing the information, we 
can determine if it is profitable to wait before implementing expensive abatement policies.  
 
The above studies focus on how the uncertainties following abatement policy impact 
the level of abatement to be taken. Elofsson (2003) solves a cost minimisation problem with 
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respect to different pollutant load reduction measures, to determine the cost effective 
abatement level. Gren (2008) uses stochastic programming to minimise costs, resulting in 
the optimal allocation of mitigation and adaptation measures. Our approach differs from 
previous studies as our method focuses on what the value of information would be 
regarding uncertainties on time lag. Unlike Elofsson (2003) and Gren (2008b), we do not 
calculate the cost effective levels of abatement, instead we assume the cost effective level is 
in fact the high abatement policy as assigned by HELCOM. Our results quantify the value of 
waiting, we argue that if it is profitable to wait for more information, a high abatement 
strategy (cost effective) will not be employed in period one, in order to keep the option of 
investing open until more information is attained (end of period one).   
 
The uncertainties of abatement policy are often regarded as one of the reasons 
countries have failed to comply with load reduction targets. It is uncertain how long 
nutrients will take to leave the Baltic Sea, leading to uncertain benefits from abatement. If 
this information were to be known, then the governing body HELCOM could set more 
informed load reduction targets. Table 3 displayed the load reductions of the BSAP and the 
actual reductions made. Some countries failed to make any reductions. The uncertainty of 
benefits combined with irreversibility of policy, could be one of the reasons why some 
countries may feel it is not profitable for them to engage in nutrient reductions. By 
addressing this uncertainty, it may motivate these countries to follow allocated load 
reductions. We find this information is worth over 8.6 billion EUR, encouraging further 
research. 
 
6.2 Limitations of Our Study 
Our method successfully valued perfect information related to the uncertain time lag 
of benefits. However, our findings may need to be interpreted with caution due to the 
assumptions we have made. Firstly, we assume abatement costs remain the same 
throughout the policy period (1991-2040).  By making this assumption, we disregard some 
important aspects like international knowledge diffusion and increasing technological 
change, which we acknowledged earlier. Knowledge diffusion could mean cost effective 
abatement choices are impacted by the potential for the abatement to add to the stock of 
experience, both domestically as well as abroad (Elofsson 2014). Whereas, it has been long 
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established that technological innovation can lead to positive spill overs, and reduce the cost 
of abatement policy (see e.g. Löschel 2002, and Lindqvist and Gren 2013). Since we do not 
consider costs falling over time, we may have overestimated the costs following abatement. 
 
In relation to this, since we assumed that costs are the same in every period, there 
are no potential benefits to reap from enforcing a high abatement strategy in period one. 
Therefore, our thesis considers the scenario that having high abatement in period two 
entails the same cost, despite the previous policy taken. This is unlikely and could 
overestimates our cost calculations. It is more likely there are some potential gains from 
using a high abatement strategy in period one e.g. in terms of learning by doing.   
 
We have also assumed that benefits are the same every year (depending on which 
policy has been implemented). However, previous studies have revealed that nitrogen 
abatement contributes to the reduction of phosphorus pollution (Howarth 2005). This could 
mean we have underestimated the benefits of nitrogen reductions in our calculations, since 
we do not consider the subsequent phosphorus pollution reductions that could occur.  
 
Algae production requires both nitrogen and phosphorus, however, a single nutrient 
is usually limiting growth, because both nutrients are needed in fixed proportions (Elofsson 
2006). If a basin is phosphorus limited, then reducing nitrogen would have no effect, it 
would in fact be cost effective to only reduce phosphorus in this case. Our model abstracts 
away from considering the Baltic Sea as seven separate basins with different characteristics, 
instead we assume nitrogen reductions will benefit all basins equally. We combine benefits 
of all countries, and do not differentiate between basins or countries. This could potentially 
overestimate the benefits from abatement.  
 
Our thesis is limited to considering only nitrogen abatement, although phosphorus is 
also harmful to the sea. We only take account of this nutrient due to the literature available. 
Hökby and Söderqvist (2003) finds the price elasticity of nitrogen reduction. This allowed us 
to integrate the demand function for nitrogen reduction and use a method by Gren et al 
(2009) to find the benefits from abatement. However, previous studies have not considered 
the elasticity of phosphorus reduction, so the same method could not be applied. Recall 
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from section 2 that data on the benefits received from nutrient reductions can also be found 
using consumer valuation studies. We could not use this method since we wanted to 
distinguish the benefits attained from high and low abatement, hence we required a benefit 
function. Since we could not calculate a benefit function for phosphorus, we could not 
consider this nutrient.  
 
One final point to consider is that our answer is very sensitive to the allocation of 
early and late benefits. Due to the time constraint of this thesis, we could only consider one 
possible realisation of early and late benefits. However, if we had more time, it could be 
beneficial to look at more timings of early and late benefits, and formulate a confidence 
interval of what the value of information could lay between. 
 
6.3 Ethical Implications of Our Research 
The choice of discount rate was an ethical issue we briefly discussed in section 4.4. By 
selecting a positive discount rate, we are valuing the future less than the present, this is 
highly debated since the stream of benefits received in the future is considered to be worth 
less than the current period. We attempt to account for this in the sensitivity analysis, where 
we recalculate the quasi option value with a zero discount rate. We found that this increased 
the value of information substantially.   
 
Another ethical implication of our research findings relates to the distribution of 
benefits. The benefits are aggregated over all nine countries surrounding the Baltic Sea, with 
no consideration of how these benefits are actually divided amongst the countries. Our 
research question was considered on an international level. However, it is unlikely benefits 
will be distributed equally, since the willingness to pay for abatement are not equal across 
countries. Hyytiäinen et al (2013) combines a catchment, marine and economic model to 
weigh the costs and benefits of nutrient abatement. They find that the improved water 
quality benefited Sweden and Finland most, while Latvia and Lithuania benefited the least. 
This raises the ethical issue of how benefits are distributed, and who gains the most, we do 
not consider the political problems that could ascend with cooperation. To address this issue 
we could have found separate quasi option values for each country, allowing us to compare 
the value of information for each.  
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Furthermore, it can be argued that finding a high quasi option value suggests we can 
delay investing in abatement policy, until we achieve more information. This is of course an 
ethical implication since we know we must abate now. Nevertheless, this thesis is simply 
with the aim to quantify uncertainty, giving a possible value that information can be worth 
to justify if research is beneficial, and to explain a possible reason why countries may not be 
committing to load reductions. We argue that by putting a number on the uncertainty, it 
could motivate action.  
 
6.4 Policy Relevance  
One final factor to consider is the policy relevance. We believe our results can be 
used to guide policy making, despite the assumptions we have made. Our study has revealed 
it is valuable to conduct research into the timing of benefits, associated with abatement in 
the Baltic Sea. This area could benefit from increased research, aimed at eliminating this 
uncertainty. Thus making expected benefits more transparent, and therefore possibly 
motivating the affected countries to reduce emissions. There is a danger that countries may 
be discouraged to engage in abatement, if research finds that benefits are expected to be 
received with a substantial time lag. Nevertheless, more research should be conducted to 
find the value of other uncertainties in the Baltic Sea. These values could then be compared 
to what we have found, thus determining where it is most profitable to fund research. 
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the significance of using the quasi option value 
model to quantify the uncertainty of time lag. To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
work has been done to value the uncertainty of time lag, nor has this model been used to 
address uncertainties in the Baltic Sea. We have successfully applied this model to our 
research question, and calculated a value that could potentially inform policy.  
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Appendix 1 
Our cost function was , by setting  we get 
Equation A1 
                [A1] 
 
Applying exponential we get      [A2] 
 
Hence                                                    [A3] 
 
This can be written as                           [A4] 
 
Leading to                                                   [A5] 
 
Where                                                                        [A6] 
 
Equation A5 is differentiated to obtain the marginal cost curve, this is written as Equation 7 
in the main text 
                                                              [7] 
 
Appendix 2 
The demand function is Equation A8 (taken from Gren et al (2009)) 
                 [A8] 
 
is a constant, which represents the intercept of the demand curve while  is the 
coefficient, which represents the slope of the demand curve. Finally  and  are the 
consumer quantity, and price demanded respectively. Equation A9 and A10 define and 
.  
 
              [A9] 
 
and  
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                              [A10] 
Where is equal to the income elasticity, which we know is equal to -1.86 from Hökby and 
Söderqvist (2003).  
 
 
The inverse demand function simply becomes  
                         [A11] 
 
Equation A11 is what we need to integrate with respect to quantity, to get the benefits of 
abating the quantity . 
 
                     [A12] 
 
The integration of this is written as Equation 8 in the main text, which is the benefit function 
 
 
                            [8] 
 
 
Appendix 2.1 
 
We assume that for early benefits between year 10 and 20, and for late benefits 
between year 25 and 35, benefits follow a linear change. We use the equation of a line; Y= 
mX + b, where m is the slope and b is the intercept on the Y-axis, to determine the level of 
benefits in each of these years. We calculate the slope using ∆Y/∆X, this is simply the change 
in the Y-axis, divided by the change in the X-axis. We will use the point when stable benefits 
are reached (year 20 for early and year 35 for late) to calculate this. The change in the Y-axis 
is simply the stable level of benefits achieved, while the change in the X-axis is 10 years. 
After we have the slope, we can find the intercept by rearranging the equation to b= Y- mX. 
We will then have the equation of the line, and use this to derive the corresponding benefits 
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between when benefits start, and when stable benefits are achieved by simply inserting 
different years into the equation (Y= mX +b).  
 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Table A1. Aggregated country costs of strategy A++ in EUR (1991-2015 and 2016-2040) with discount rate 0. 
Country Discounted Aggregate Costs 1991-2015 
Discounted Aggregate 
Costs 2016-2040 
Denmark 9,707,216,106 9,707,216,106 
Estonia 7,640,402 7,640,402 
Finland 6,013,361 6,013,361 
Germany 1,359,221,403 1,359,221,403 
Latvia 25,837,534 25,837,534 
Lithuania 1,593,964,015 1,593,964,015 
Poland 16,987,778,885 16,987,778,885 
Russia 619,321,078 619,321,078 
Sweden 2,754,942,443 2,754,942,443 
   Total Cost 33,061,935,228 33,061,935,228 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Aggregated country costs of strategy A--/A-+ in EUR (1991-2015 and 2016-2040) with discount rate 0. 
Country Discounted Aggregate Costs 1991-2015 (A-) 
Discounted Aggregate 
Costs 2016-2040 (A-) 
Discounted Aggregate 
Costs 2016-2040 (A+) 
Denmark 4,206,606,588 4,206,606,588 9,707,216,106 
Estonia 0 0 7,640,402 
Finland 0 0 6,013,361 
Germany 12,056,528 12,056,528 1,359,221,403 
Latvia 0 0 25,837,534 
Lithuania 292,051,134 292,051,134 1,593,964,015 
Poland 0 0 16,987,778,885 
Russia 0 0 619,321,078 
Sweden 202,678,629 202,678,629 2,754,942,443 
    Total 
Cost 
4,713,392,890 4,713,392,890 33,061,935,228 
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Table A3. Early and late benefits with zero discount rate, in EUR. 
Policy Period one Period 2 Total
A++ 93,146,900,387 350,409,768,123 443,556,668,510
A-- 20,344,576,760 76,534,360,192 96,878,936,953
A-+ 20,344,576,760 258,592,330,297 278,936,907,057
A++ 0 443,556,668,510 443,556,668,510
A-- 0 96,878,936,952 96,878,936,952
A-+ 0 278,936,907,057 278,936,907,057
Ea
rly
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Table A4. Early benefits assuming year 0 start, in EUR.  
Policy Period one Period 2 Total
A++ 122,136,428,430 84,424,757,851 206,561,186,281
A-- 26,676,292,319 18,439,539,688 45,115,832,008
A-+ 26,676,292,319 74,188,059,671 100,864,351,991
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